government. Words such as imperial,$ imperilled,% impossible,& plebiscitary,' symbolic,( rhetorical,) coalitional,* and administrative,"! to name but a few, have all been used to describe the state of the presidency over the past three decades. Political scientists, while holding differing views about the specifics of the presidency, have agreed that the development of presidential power can be seen from the vantage point of two fairly distinct historical epochs -the '' traditional '' presidency and the '' modern '' presidency. New theories are beginning to suggest that changes in the national and international environment have led to fundamental changes in the office of the presidency, which have increased or altered the demands placed upon the man in the White House. It is suggested that such changes raise the prospect of another transformation toward a post modern presidency."" Gary King notes that most of the existing literature on the presidency is composed of first-class biographical accounts of presidents and their administrations."# For this, he says, scholars should be justifiably proud. His main criticism is that presidency research as opposed to contextual description lags considerably behind that of other areas of concern in political science. Scholars of Congress, for example, have spent considerable time recording systematic patterns. Their results have been '' duplicated, replicated, verified, and made much more precise. '' Accordingly, he believes that presidency scholars should, for the time being, refrain from making prescriptive statements. The consequent need is for parsimonious explanations rather than increasingly rich descriptive accounts. Mindful of these concerns, this essay simply attempts to establish, using data on presidential activity, whether the evidence offers support for the post-modern presidency theory."$ In establishing the '' going international theory '' Rose concerns himself almost entirely with foreign affairs and provides a clear comparison between the modern and post modern eras. By contrast with the traditional presidency, he says that the modern president was expected to : propose legislation ; make budget recommendations to Congress ; secure Congressional endorsement of his proposals ; be active in defending US interests abroad ; be a visible national leader projecting personality and ideas through the media ; and command the political and national resources to meet these expectations."% It is this last expectation that leads into Rose's theory of why the presidency has now moved beyond the modern era, for, in one key important aspect, the modern presidency was the same as the traditional presidency : The power of the president was determined by factors internal to the United States.
Rose explains that the ability of modern presidents to act in the way that they did all stems from this last observation. Modern presidents, in generally undisputed terms, had the required command over necessary political, national, and international resources. The military and economic might of the US resulted in hegemony in the international system. In a vintage portrait of the Cold War\modern president, for example, Rossiter describes the president as the undisputed leader of a coalition of free nations. When the White House spoke, other nations listened"&. Their attention reflected both the military and economic power of the United States and their own relative weakness. Interdependence describes the world of the contemporary post-modern president in which he simply must accept the existence of international constraints. This, says Rose, makes the president's involvement in big international issues a much more ambiguous attribute today than when Rossiter wrote in the s.
Hippler notes that the modern era was one of bipolarity between the USA and the USSR, with the United States dominating if not quite dictating the direction of Western global relations. What Rose would call the post-modern era is defined by Hippler as one of multipolarity. In this multipolar world the USA is only one among a number of major players His theory is given support by two other leading authors in this field, namely : Samuel Kernell, Going Public : New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington DC : Congressional Quarterly Inc., ) and Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President : Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (New York : Cornell University Press, ). Barilleaux, Kernell, and Lowi's theories, taken collectively, are based on institutional and domestic changes in the presidential environment and the presidency itself. "% Richard Rose in Edwards, Kessel, and Rockman, (), op. cit.
in an order where one of the two pillars of the bipolar modern era no longer exists."' In an interdependent international system, the president is only one among a multiplicity of actors in Hippler's multipolar world. The cast of actors very much depends upon the problem at hand, and the fluidity of the international system today makes it very difficult to specify which influences and actors will be most important in any given situation. In a polycentric or multipolar world, there is no assurance that the United States will even be one of these actors, even on matters of major White House concern. German reunification, for example, occurred as a result of direct negotiation between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev, with America sitting on the sidelines.
In an attempt to widen the focus of scholars researching the presidency, Rose talks of three imperatives that a post-modern president must face."( In order to hold office, the president needs popular support, and, once in office, he needs to maintain that popular support in order to win legislative battles with Congress. The president therefore has to '' go public. '' In order to direct government when in office, he must directly influence the other power holders in Washington. The president therefore has to '' go Washington. '' To maintain US national security and the health of the economy in a post-modern global environment, the president must co-operate, bargain with, and thus influence other executives around the world. The president therefore has to '' go international. '' The postmodern president is distinct from the modern president because of the need to carry out this third imperative -it was simply not necessary in the modern era. It is consequently in the going international imperative that the proof of the post-modern presidency theory should exist.
It is interesting to note why international affairs have traditionally had a much greater appeal than domestic affairs, for, if the trends identified in this paper are correct, then the division of priorities into domestic and foreign policy boxes may not be appropriate in the future. Modern presidents, in general terms, have been able to call upon the hearts of other policy makers when dabbling in global politics by invoking concepts of consensus, of doing what is right, of the need for the nation to speak with one voice -in other words, they have issued a call for politics to stop at the water's edge.") Members of Congress have traditionally adhered to "' Jochen Hippler J., Pax Americana ? Hegemony or Decline (Broughton Gifford, U.K : The Cromwell Press, ). "( Richard Rose, op. cit., . ") The concept of politics stopping at the water's edge -in other words, the relationship between the President and Congress -is one addressed in several forthcoming papers by the author.
such a call -with good reason. In the modern era of a pre-eminent America, foreign policy did not win votes back home in the district. Members were happy to let the President take the credit (or the blame) for foreign policy, while they were left with the domestic vote-winning goodies collectively known as '' bringing home the bacon. '' The post-modern theory suggests that this may no longer be the case. Implicit in the new theory is the blurring of foreign and domestic policy as a result of merging economic interests and the dissolving of the ideological battle between West and East that was the basis of every president's clarion call for consensus in foreign affairs. Vietnam showed that Congress could not afford to be lax in granting the president virtually unchallenged powers in foreign affairs. Economic interdependencemuch more important in the long term than the Vietnam blip -dictates that Congress has an integral say in the new foreign policy, as it is Congress who holds the power of the purse. In a zero sum political game between president and Congress, as the power of the Cold War sword has rapidly diminished, then the power of the post-Cold War purse has begun to gain pre-eminence. Thus the institutional balance of power looks set to change once more in favour of the Congress, and the president's ability -perhaps even desire -to seek refuge in the realms of foreign policy is rapidly being eroded.
The importance (and relevance) of whether the presidency has altered in the way the theory suggests could not be more clear and apparent. It could be argued, with the benefit of hindsight, that the shift from the modern to the post-modern era has had as great an effect on American society, and more specifically the presidency, as the shift from the traditional to the modern era had.
In terms of domestic politics, the questioning of presidential authority as a result of the Vietnam War and Watergate, the rise of a newly assertive Congress, the general decline of the party system and thus the president's ability to '' control '' Congress, have fundamentally altered the president's role within the US political structure. In terms of global politics, the president, as a result of the above factors, is hemmed in more at home, while the relative decline of American political and economic hegemony has reduced his ability to make other leaders ask '' how high ? '' when he says '' jump. '' In terms of American society as a whole, the shift from a national politics of a nation pre-eminent in world affairs to a system of learning to cope with economic and political interdependence is in every way as important as the s shift from state politics and economics to national politics and economics. The modern to post-modern shift is seen here as the natural progression of the original traditional to modern transition.
Given such factors, it would seem that a fundamental reordering of the way we think about American politics and society is required along the lines of the change in attitude that came with Roosevelt's New Deal in the s and s. If all this truly is the case, then the implications for the relative position of the United States in the New World Order and, more specifically, the office of the presidency in terms of both policy output, power relations with the other branches of government, and indeed other governments, would be enormous. Such implications will be considered in the conclusion.
II
The purpose of this section is to present data concerning presidential activities in order to analyse whether the changed presidential environment has led to a different type of presidency. Hypotheses, Data, and Methods Going international is defined by Rose as '' bargaining with foreigners … on whose co-operation the president depends for success in foreign and economic policy. ''"* In other words, this involves the president actively participating in the politics of an open international system and engaging in a dialogue with the executive offices of other nations. There are four main variables I propose to analyse which should combine to give a clear picture of this trend in presidential activities. The period under study will be from the administration of Dwight Eisenhower through to, but excluding, that of Bill Clinton.#! The first variable is the number of countries visited by the president.#" "* Richard Rose, op. cit., . #! The source of information for all of the four main variables is the Public Papers of the Presidents. These are published each year and for each president, by the Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration of the United States of America. At the time of writing the data on the Clinton presidency was incomplete. #" A number of different of authors have used this measure when studying the changing nature of the presidency in the past. Unlike other authors, however, set piece prearranged meetings such as those of the G, will be included as the very nature of these meetings alone is an indicator of growing interdependence. All countries that a president has visited will be counted separately, even if he visited several countries in one single trip away from the USA. For example, if a president goes on a tour of Europe in which he visits Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and Austria, five visits will be recorded as opposed to just one. The reason for this is that whatever country a president visits, he almost without exception holds a meeting with the Head of State
The second variable is very similar and comprises the number of trips to the USA by foreign leaders.## Both these variables are intended as indicators of the frequency that a president '' engages in dialogue '' with other executive offices and co-operates with foreign leaders. If the postmodern presidency thesis is correct, meetings between leaders should increase over time.
The third and fourth variables are designed specifically to address the point that the issues facing post-modern presidents are wider in scope and number than those facing the modern president, and that the post-modern president has to actively participate in the politics of an open international system. The third variable is a study of both the number and content of major addresses concerning foreign affairs.#$ The following points may be an indicator of the growing complexity that is hypothesized ; the number of foreign countries and peoples mentioned ; the number of foreign leaders mentioned ; the number of international organizations and foreignpolicy doctrines mentioned such as GATT, the UN, the Marshall Plan, the INF Treaty. The fourth variable is the number of minor addresses made each year by the president that relate to foreign affairs.#% It is reasonable to expect that the more nations a president mentions in such high profile addresses, the more foreign leaders he mentions by title or name, the more international organizations he talks about, then the more his attitudes and thinking are being positively coloured by the need to '' go international ''.
All four of the main variables indicated above were chosen deliberately and\or the Head of Government of that country, and as I am interested in the breadth of co-operation between the president and other Heads of State\Government I felt this was the best way to approach this particular problem. ## No other works on the international aspect of the presidency seem to take this variable into account, and yet it would seem to be just as good a measure as the number of countries the president himself visits. Again, it is practically without exception that each Head of State or Government who visits the USA, holds one or more meetings with the President. #$ A '' Major Foreign Policy Address '' is any speech which the president gave that was broadcast to the Nation as a whole relating to foreign affairs (as indicated by the editors of the Public Papers of the Presidents) and thus includes all Inaugural Addresses and State of the Union Addresses. Also included in this category are all speeches that the various presidents have given in front of foreign legislative chambers and the United Nations General Assembly. #% The '' Minor Addresses '' category includes all speeches made by the President that broadcast to a specific, rather than a national audience, and all proclamations, statements, off the cuff remarks, press releases, press conferences, and letters to other national leaders etc. as detailed in the appropriate volumes of the Public Papers of the Presidents. Table  shows the average number of countries visited by each president each year, the average number of foreign heads of state or government that visited the USA each year during each administration, the average number of major foreign policy addresses given by each president each year, and the average number of minor addresses given by each president each year. The data presented in Table  and Figures - offer tentative support for the theory. The number of countries that presidents have visited on average during each year of their administrations increases up to Nixon, levels out, and then increases again for Bush. It could, in fact, be said that the huge increase for Bush is an idiosyncratic anomaly in that President Bush simply liked foreign policy. This conclusion is rejected for two reasons. First, when one takes into account the fact that both President Kennedy and President Nixon were also considered to be primarily foreign-policy presidents, one has to ask why the average number of foreign countries visited per year were considerably lower than Bush's ? Secondly, Diagram Two shows specifically that, in terms of the number of foreign leaders to visit Washington each year, the trend is as hypothesized.
One possible answer to the question raised above concerning the Bush presidency is that ease of travel and improved communications have necessarily lead to a situation whereby politicians the world over simply '' do more of everything '' these days. This potential problem with validating the post-modern presidency theory is tackled in the conclusion, but, briefly, one could argue that the very fact that travel and communications are now in a completely different league supports the notion of an altered presidential environment -in fact they demand it.
The minor addresses variable provides the clearest evidence in support of the '' going international '' theory. Figure  shows that the Kennedy and Nixon presidencies deviate slightly from the overall trend, but that otherwise the number of such addresses rises steadily, regardless of the party of the incumbent president. In fact, since the Nixon presidency, each successive president has made more minor addresses on foreign policy per year than his predecessor. Table  shows that the average number of major foreign policy addresses given each year on average by the presidents has fluctuated wildly. This is counter to expectations. The high number of addresses given by Reagan was due to his personal habit of making a national radio broadcast every week, approximately half of which were related to foreign affairs. None the less, the relationship between the number of major foreign-policy addresses per year and the existence of a post-modern presidency is tenuous at best. It could well be that the content of these addresses is more important than their actual number, and will produce a pattern much closer to that originally expected. Table  shows the contents of the major foreign policy addresses given by each president during his administration. The average number of foreign nations, foreign leaders, and international organizations or agreements\treaties mentioned per page per speech are shown.#& It was initially expected that the length of major foreign policy addresses would increase over time. The data shown in Table  do not support this expectation. In fact, if anything, the length of such speeches has actually declined over the time-period in question. The reasons for this trend are numerous, but, briefly, one could argue that the increasingly #& The reason that the data are shown in this way (per page per speech) is that it takes the length of the speech out of the final equation thus allowing for a better comparison of the content of such Addresses over time given that speech length fluctuates in an unpatterned manner. short attention span of media and voters alike may have had an effect. In Ronald Reagan's case, the president's style itself may be the cause, given his media-friendly technique and style of delivery. The fluctuating length of major foreign-policy speeches is thus similar to the number of such speeches made, in that it is a poor indicator for the going international theory.
Figures  and  show the number of foreign nations mentioned per page per speech and the number of foreign leaders and organizations mentioned per page per speech. Figure  shows that the number of nations mentioned increase in a clear and steady fashion following the Ford presidency. This is clearly in line with what should be expected if the going international component of the post-modern presidency thesis is correct, and supports the theory about the expected change in activities during the Carter, Reagan, and Bush presidencies as a result of international events. Figure  , although providing some rather unexpected results for the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies in relation to the number of international organisations mentioned, provides support for the theory when studied more closely. After an initial high number of organizations mentioned per speech under Eisenhower and Kennedy, the number falls significantly with the Johnson presidency and then resumes a gradual and expected upward trend, broken only by Reagan. The number of foreign leaders mentioned per speech almost parallels the number of organizations with the exception of the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies.
It is most notable that the number of organizations mentioned per speech by the presidents is greater than the number of foreign leaders up until the Ford presidency, Johnson being the exception to the rule. From the Ford presidency onward, however, the number of leaders mentioned exceeds the number of organizations, with Carter the sole exception. In particular, the rise in the number of leaders mentioned from the Ford presidency onwards is perhaps the strongest indicator of greater personal contact and diplomacy. It is a significant finding. The obvious critique to this is that all such data reflects is the rise of international summitry. This would not be a valid critique of the '' going international '' theory however, because it is exactly the kind of altered presidential activity the theory would postulate. One should clearly expect this kind of pattern if the hypothesized increase in participation in the open international system and thus the increase in co-operation and interdependence were real. Given that Carter, Reagan, and Bush engaged in international dialogue -travelling more frequently and receiving more foreign leaders -than any of the so-called modern presidents, a more personal style of foreignpolicy approach, as indicated by the number of leaders they each mention on average in their major addresses, is no surprise. This is reinforced when one takes into account the parallel global political developments of the s and early s outlined previously. The rise of international summitry, including G meetings and US-Soviet presidential summits, for example, reaching its peak in the Reagan and Bush presidencies, almost demands the very kind of pattern that has been identified in Figures  and .
III
When George Washington first took the oath I have just sworn to uphold, news travelled slowly across the land by horseback, and across the ocean by boat … now communications and commerce are global, investment is mobile, technology is almost magical … [We] must at the same time, cut our massive debt and we must do so in a world in which we must compete for every opportunity. It will not be easy. It will require sacrifice … To renew America we must meet challenges abroad as well as at home. There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic. The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race ; they affect us all. Today, as an old order passes, the world is more free but less stable … Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change lest it engulf us.#'
Uncertainty is an unavoidable component of any scientific research, even (some might say especially) in the case of the straightforward indicators used in this initial look at the post-modern presidency theory. None the less, it has been demonstrated, by assessing some basic indicators of presidential activity, that some tentative support exists for the idea that presidential activity and thus, the presidency, has changed along the lines suggested by Richard Rose.
It was hypothesised that changes in America's position in the world during the last few decades would be reflected in the data presented above. The prediction was that all four main variables chosen for analysis would show a steady increase over time culminating with the Bush presidency. The number of minor addresses concerning foreign policy was the most supportive variable in this respect, and the number of countries visited on average per year by the presidents and the average number of visits to the USA by foreign leaders per year also suggested that the going international theory may be correct. The number of major foreign-policy addresses each year did not prove to be a very supportive indicator. The same applies to the actual length of the major addresses which, if anything, declined over the period in question, contrary to expectations.
On the whole, however, the content of these major addresses provided some very interesting results which tie in well with the assertions made in the post-modern presidency theory. It is clear that the Carter, Reagan, and Bush presidencies presented a different and distinct pattern to that of former incumbents. In the case of all three categories analysed in the major addresses, the pattern from Eisenhower to Ford generally tended to be either flat or marginally upwards in the number of references. Come the Carter presidency, the rate of increase rose considerably, as would be expected given the global political developments of the s and the s.
It would seem, therefore, that four key questions present themselves for discussion in the remainder of this conclusion : Given that the answer to the two preceding questions is positive, it should be concluded that the data analysed in this thesis do provide an initial indication that presidents have '' gone international, '' in Rose's terminology, more and more over the time period studied, in the manner that was hypothesized. Having established that the environment that the president operates within has changed in a qualitative sense, the data presented here would seem to indicate that various presidents have responded, albeit tentatively in some cases, to this important change.
() Finally, is there consequently a justifiable claim for saying that the Presidency has moved into a post-modern era ?
This question returns to the main aim of the paper stated in the introduction. It would seem that the best way to answer it is to give a guarded yes. There would seem to be a justifiable claim for saying that the presidency has moved into a post-modern era as indicated in the data chosen to express this theory.
There is one major criticism of the post-modern presidency theory and, by implication, the indicators of presidential activity reported in this paper that has been mentioned briefly but deserves further comment. One possible critique of the theory is that all it shows (and consequently all the indicators suggest) is the fact that there are more countries, more issues, new technologies, and a greater ease of travel and communication in the so-called post-modern era. In other words, what is being measured is not a post-modern presidency at all, simply a changed environment. This should not necessarily be taken as a critique. It should be taken as support for the theory, because this is exactly the point of saying that the presidency has changed. There can be no serious argument that the environment of the presidency could change so dramatically and yet the operation and activities of the president remain the same. The very fact that the environment and technology has changed so much over a relatively short period of time practically demands a new style of executive branch government, and potentially a new set of institutional arrangements within the governmental system as a whole. What this could mean, of course, is that the post-modern era has witnessed the rise of postmodern executives the world over. In this sense, the changes indicated by this paper may not be peculiar to the United States. On a point of justification, this hardly matters within the context of this one paper, but what it does suggest is that the post-modern executive is an area ripe for comparative study. The data concerning the four main variables, while not providing overwhelming and concrete support for the theory, show a definite trend in the expected direction, and indicate that the post-modern presidency thesis has the potential to become a very real development in the study of the presidency of the United States.
The main concern of this essay has been twofold. Following a brief introduction, the need to call into question the existence of the modern presidency was established. Secondly, although the theoretical development could be considered to be more important at this stage, it was considered both necessary and desirable to begin to attempt to quantify the notion of the post-modern presidency and operationalize the key notions identified in the theory. It is not claimed that the variables and data studied here are the only, or even the best, variables to analyse the concept of the going international post-modern president, but merely that they are a legitimate and realistic starting-point for further study into what is an extremely complex theory.
Rose says that studying the presidency is sure to be ripe with controversies and that these should be taken as vital signs rather than as evidence of morbidity. For too long, he says, the study of the presidency seemed to be isolated from these essential controversies. This essay simply suggests that the concept of the post-modern presidency is one of the controversies which can no longer be isolated from the mainstream of American political science.
